Sovereignty and Diamonds in Southern Africa, 1908-1920 by Press, Steven
PRESS FOR PUBLICATION(DO NOT DELETE) 5/2/2018 6:06 PM 
 
473 
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AFRICA, 1908-1920 
STEVEN PRESS∗ 
In 1907 the German colonial army, wrapping up its genocide of Nama 
and Herero peoples in Southwest Africa, generally counted the Namib Desert 
as more trouble than it was worth. So did the German people and 
government, for that matter. In Summer 1908, however, a group of workers 
laying railway track in the Namib found diamonds lying in the sand.1 In short 
order, the Namib became the richest diamond find in history: the home to an 
estimated 1.6 billion carats of rough stones, or about the equivalent of the 
entire amount extracted in human history prior to the twentieth century.2 
Germany, and its much ballyhooed overseas empire, appeared to have won 
the lottery. 
Mania promptly gripped the stock exchange in Berlin. In mere months, 
traders drove up share prices of German diamond companies, and even some 
colonial companies that had no diamond business, by as much as 2000%.3 
One astonished consultant, after inspecting the Namibian fields, assured the 
bankers backing large diamond miners that they could comfortably expect 
billions of marks in exchange for virtually no effort.4 This projection was 
staggering, given that, at this time, Germany’s entire bank capital totaled 
13.6 billion marks.5 It was also correct. 
The problem was that the Namib was no conventional open-pit mine – 
à la Kimberley, South Africa – but a gigantic sandbox. Diamonds in the 
Namib could easily be picked up by hand.6 Ownership and control, 
accordingly, were concerns in need of resolution. And yet, according to the 
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original treaties that underpinned German colonialism in Southwest Africa, 
some sovereign rights over the diamond fields lay with a colonial company 
– the Deutsche Kolonialgesellschaft für Südwestafrika – rather than with the 
German state proper.7 The German state had been meaning to buy out this 
colonial company in early 1908, more or less contemporaneously with 
Belgium’s purchase of Leopold II’s privately held sovereign rights in the 
Congo.8 But the diamond discoveries in the Namib changed everything. 
Now, by virtue of its ownership of sovereign rights, the Kolonialgesellschaft 
intended to stand pat and collect major annual rents from the diamond boom. 
Each new mining business was to pay royalties to the Kolonialgesellschaft.9 
Moreover, because the Kolonialgesellschaft had the “sovereign right” to 
control mining permits, it could and did regulate operations such that only 
large mining companies owned by large German banks – whose ranks, 
conveniently, made up the Kolonialgesellschaft’s main shareholders – 
succeeded. Finally, the Kolonialgesellschaft watched its own shares 
skyrocket in value and surreptitiously began cashing in on the difference, 
though without selling off a majority stake.10 
Amidst this backdrop, the nature of diamonds’ commodification also 
left the German Colonial Minister, Bernhard Dernburg with a business 
dilemma. Prior to 1908 the world diamond market ran almost exclusively 
through De Beers. Thanks to its tight grip on the mines of South Africa, then 
the world’s only significant source of diamonds, De Beers set the conditions 
for the sale of rough stones; as important, they periodically dumped 
stockpiled stones to ruin the price for rivals who dared to sell rough stones 
outside the De Beers cartel.11 Colonial Minister Dernburg reckoned that in 
order to thwart this cartel and monetize its newfound mineral wealth 
Germany would have to rely on the capital of German banks.  Germany 
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would also need to placate those same banks in order to get them to fund 
systematic extraction of the diamonds from the Namib Desert.12 
The large German banks’ shareholders, as mentioned, heavily 
overlapped with those of the Kolonialgesellschaft. As mentioned, too, 
sovereign rights held by the Kolonialgesellschaft appeared to make it an 
equal negotiating partner to the German government proper when it came to 
mining policy. And so it was that in 1908, almost as soon as the diamond 
discoveries made headlines, Dernburg issued several decrees: first, to 
criminalize all unauthorized diamond possession in Southwest Africa; 
second, to seal off all civilian access to the desert in which the diamond 
wealth rested; third, to force all diamond miners, big or small, to channel any 
rough stones they found through yet another new organization set up by the 
large German banks, the Diamanten-Regie.13 The Diamanten-Regie would 
charge every submission a fee. In return, it would work with retailers in 
places like Antwerp and New York to offload the German stones in bulk, at 
steady prices, limiting output in accordance with retail demand. If De Beers 
tried to interfere, the idea was that German banks had plenty of capital to 
weather the storm. In particular, German banks could leverage their clout in 
Belgium to get good prices on the stones’ cutting – something independent, 
small-time Germans likely could not manage.14 
From a sheer business standpoint, this arrangement seemed logical, 
recognizing as it did the nature of the De Beers cartel and the realities of 
German colonialism’s dependency on large banks. But colonialism was 
about culture, too. Dernburg’s decrees infuriated many European aspirants 
in Southwest Africa, including thousands of new emigrants to the Namib 
desert hoping to make a fortune. The small European settler had little hope 
of striking it rich in Dernburg’s colonial system, having been left largely 
without access to the diamond boom. Adjacent to this camp were farmers, 
ranchers, ex-military, and the like, who looked to colonial mineral wealth -- 
finally in view, after decades of disappointment -- to improve their lots. Such 
improvement might take the form of help in mitigating droughts killing 
crops; better still, it might entail spending on water infrastructure – then seen 
as a life-and-death issue for the small European settler in Southwest Africa.15 
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Over the next several years, a big-tent camp dissented from Dernburg’s 
policy. Elite private parties and bankers, it was alleged, did not deserve the 
lion’s share of diamond money; and yet, they were making enormous profits 
on several levels. The elites controlled, first, the Kolonialgesellschaft; 
second, the new German diamond mining companies the 
Kolonialgesellschaft was setting up (thanks to control of mining permits); 
and third, the Diamanten-Regie.16 For their part, German politicians in 
parliament largely shared the outrage. They argued that German taxpayers 
and colonial settlers had earned a bigger cut of the diamond money: both 
through massive expenditures on railroads and colonial infrastructure 
starting in the 1890s and through the blood German soldiers shed in the 
course of slaughtering the Nama and Herero between 1904 and 1907, just 
before the diamonds popped up on official radar. A majority in parliament 
therefore proceeded to rail against the Kolonialgesellschaft, whose sovereign 
rights strangely lingered past 1908 and into the heyday of the German 
diamond industry. The Kolonialgesellschaft looked like root of a social evil, 
in this view, for upon its “sovereign rights” rested a foundational impediment 
to nationalization of the diamond business and a more equitable distribution 
of the Namib diamond wealth.17 
To Colonial Secretary Dernburg, this criticism was foolish: there was, 
he reminded parliament, no way to get around the company’s wishing to hold 
onto its sovereign rights – even if those same rights had grown infinitely 
more valuable since the diamond finds in 1908. Of course, some opponents 
in parliament questioned Dernburg’s notion that a company could occupy 
this status.18  His position was arguably most consistent with the rule of law, 
as it had become clear by the end of the nineteenth century that the 
obligations and privileges associated with statehood could be owned by 
private parties as well as the public. Leopold’s Congo venture furnished a 
recent example19 as did the annals of German colonialism. 
In 1885, one Adolf Lüderitz, a Bremen merchant celebrated as the 
founder of the German colony in Southwest Africa, sold all his property in 
the Namib to the Kolonialgesellschaft. Unfortunately, no one quite knew 
what that property entailed. Lüderitz had made his name on the strength of 
two contracts produced with a Nama chief, Josef Frederiks, in 1883. The 
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contracts were more or less legitimate sales of land made with the informed 
consent of Frederiks, then at war with Herero to the north. Lüderitz, though, 
fraudulently edited the contracts and aggrandized his claims in Europe, to 
the point that the contracts became ‘treaties’ and the sale of land became the 
sale of Frederiks’ ‘sovereign rights’ over a portion of a ‘kingdom’. For a 
variety of domestic and foreign-policy reasons, German Chancellor 
Bismarck chose to embrace Lüderitz’s generous interpretation and to see it 
endorsed by other European powers at the Berlin Conference in 1884-85 – 
the very moment when Leopold II, George Goldie, and other European 
businessmen won recognition for their own privately held sovereign rights 
in Africa. Lüderitz was henceforth to stand as the sovereign ruler, on paper, 
of ‘Lüderitzland,’ with Lüderitzland existing in a sort of confederal 
relationship to the German Empire proper.20 
In 1885, Bismarck went on to recognize a series of private colonial 
regimes based on Lüderitz’s model, not just in Southwest Africa, but in 
Cameroon, Togo, New Guinea, and East Africa. Each place was, in theory, 
supposed to be run by German companies or individuals like Lüderitz, who 
would hold most sovereign rights (Landeshoheit) after buying them from 
indigenous polities. This system would emerge with only the smallest of 
contributions and oversight from Germany proper, who received a titular 
sovereign right (Oberhoheit) either via transfer from the German private 
parties or, more rarely, from the indigenous polities themselves. Over time, 
the private German sovereigns proved unwilling or incapable with regard to 
governing. Hence, Bismarck’s “system” underwent repeated adjustments. In 
Southwest Africa, for instance, Germany initially announced that it would 
share sovereign rights with a company run by Lüderitz -- not just in the 
Namib, but across a much larger area in which Germany had signed 
‘protection’ treaties with native tribes like the Herero. Such an arrangement 
never got off the ground. In fact, it did not even take hold in the former 
‘Lüderitzland,’ where the inheritors of Lüderitz’s estate, the 
Kolonialgesellschaft, bowed out and mostly chose to say Germany owned 
all sovereign rights.21 
This early vacillation seemed to confirm the complaints of prominent 
skeptics who counseled against leaving sovereign rights in the hands of 
private parties. Alas, the trend continued. In 1888, when salted fields led 
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speculators to think a gold rush was on in the Namib desert, Germany, eager 
to help the Kolonialgesellschaft attract investors at home, issued a 
proclamation declaring that the Kolonialgesellschaft still owned the 
sovereign right to adjudicate – without oversight from the German state or 
its colonial authorities proper -- all matters related to mining in the entire 
area of Southwest Africa.22 Then, only one year later, Germany’s position 
underwent a second modification.23 Now Germany said the scope of the 
Kolonialgesellschaft’s ‘mining sovereignty’ was limited to the Southern 
Namib itself – specifically, the area for which Lüderitz had signed one of his 
‘treaties’ with Frederiks in 1883. 
In 1908, the equation changed yet again. When a Thuringian railway 
foreman – or rather, his Cape-born African servant – identified diamonds 
along some railroad tracks, the find lay directly, on paper, in the midst of the 
Kolonialgesellschaft’s territory -- the original Lüderitzland. Now the powers 
behind the Kolonialgesellschaft – many of them heavy-hitter executives at 
large banks – lobbied the German government to reaffirm their sovereign 
right over mining in order that they might keep smugglers and De Beers 
away from an incipient diamond boom.24 Over the objections of a 
parliamentary majority, the German cabinet’s Colonial Ministry not only 
complied but also went so far as to help the Kolonialgesellschaft fence off 
most of the Southern Namib and implement a prohibition on unauthorized 
entry. The Kolonialgesellschaft’s territory now became the ‘Forbidden 
Diamond Zone’ (Diamantensperrgebiet). Inside it, according to the German 
government, mining could occur only with the Kolonialgesellschaft’s 
permission. 
One might easily liken this series of moves to Opéra bouffe. But where 
it left the area’s day-to-day governance and jurisdiction proved a deadly 
serious question, not least because around 6,000 African workers 
consistently populated the area.25 Starting in 1908, Germany treated the 
Forbidden Diamond Zone as if it were the Kolonialgesellschaft’s own state: 
one that matched up with the precise coordinates into which Lüderitz had 
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once aimed to place his would-be state under loose German ‘protection’ 
(Oberhoheit). On several occasions German colonial bureaucrats sniffed 
around the Forbidden Diamond Zone, eager to investigate a complaint about 
labor abuses, theft, or tax evasion. Surprisingly, however, the bureaucrats 
found themselves in the rather curious position of having to defer to 
Kolonialgesellschaft officials in matters of local law enforcement.26 Back in 
Berlin, Germany proper insisted that it wished to respect the 
Kolonialgesellschaft’s rights, and that the Kolonialgesellschaft could 
generally interpret its right of ‘mining sovereignty’ as encompassing any 
number of matters vaguely connected to mining. For the time being, lawyers 
for the Kolonialgesellschaft successfully argued that these matters included 
policing of criminal activity, worker health, taxation, and the like.27 
Naturally, such a dynamic did not appeal to many members of the 
German parliament, which remained displeased with the apparently 
disproportionate amount of diamond revenue flowing into the coffers of the 
Kolonialgesellschaft. Yes, the Kolonialgesellschaft paid some taxes on 
earnings, on account of its being incorporated inside Germany. But that was 
not a sufficient reason to let the Kolonialgesellschaft and the large banks 
behind it keep the rest of the diamond profits – or, most pressingly, to let 
them monopolize the booming diamond trade by keeping almost everyone 
else out of the desert. In 1910, in an effort to quiet the parliamentary and 
public perception that Germany had given away ‘million-dollar gifts’ in 
Southwest Africa to the Kolonialgesellschaft, Germany tried to reach a new 
written agreement with the Kolonialgesellschaft. Crucially, the negotiations 
centered not on a public-private contract, but on a treaty between sovereign 
equals. In exchange for indefinite preservation of the Forbidden Diamond 
Zone and Dernburg’s policies, the Kolonialgesellschaft offered to cede its 
mining sovereignty to Germany. Germany would also share in half of the 
profits moving forward.28 
How these negotiations failed, and what kind of fallout ensued, are 
subjects of this author’s ongoing research. For now, suffice it to say that the 
Namib diamond story in Southwest Africa was part of an under-analyzed, 
global chapter in the era of New Imperialism: the liquidation – often 
incomplete – of privately held sovereign rights in colonial settings. I have 
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already mentioned the Belgian buyout of Leopold II in 1908. For other 
illustrations, one could look to Portuguese concession companies in 
Mozambique or to German New Guinea, where a company bought and sold 
a full boat of sovereign rights two separate times in the 1890s, with Germany 
as the counterparty.29 When viewed in tandem such moments spotlight how 
the line between state and company frequently disintegrated during this era. 
We know that at many points in history, a nominally subsidiary 
corporation’s power often grew so great, and its reach so extensive, that a 
given state’s recognized supremacy in international and domestic eyes could 
prove irrelevant to negotiations. That was frequently the case with De Beers, 
often said to represent an “imperium in imperio” in South Africa, Rhodesia, 
and Botswana. But, in the Namib diamond boom of the early twentieth 
century, the notion of an “imperium in imperio” proved literal, to the extent 
that the Kolonialgesellschaft’s claim to mining sovereignty, loosely 
interpreted from 1908 through World War I, left a state legally responsible 
for enforcing its own absence from governance in a territory. At least in this 
aspect, De Beers could never outdo its German rivals. 
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